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In this Article, I will attempt to relate the movement toward
constitutional reform, perceptible in several Latin American countries, to some socio-structural variables that have a considerable
impact on the process of consolidation of democracy in those countries, and which may be influenced by institutional design.
I.

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND CORPORATISM

In the past decade, a wave of democratization spread through
most of Latin America without reaching some isles of authoritarianism, such as Chile. This process is often described as the "transition
to democracy." ' But this terminology conceals an ambiguity because
it may refer to two distinct situations. The first is the process of
adjustments of norms or institutions towards the strictures of the full
democratic rule of law--competition in free elections by different
political parties, an independent judiciary able to enforce a bill of
rights, and so forth. The second describes a situation where these
liberal democratic institutions exist in full force, but their stability is
not yet completely secured, and political action and other measures
are being taken in order to achieve the necessary degree of consensus
and social adhesion to those institutions.
In general, Latin American countries are in transit to democracy
more in the second sense than in the first. In countries like Argentina
and Uruguay, for instance, full liberal and democratic mechanisms
are in place. Nevertheless, the idea that social tensions and conflicts
* Carlos Santiago Nino is a Professor of Law at the University of Buenos Aires,
Argentina. He was a close advisor to former President Alfonsin of Argentina during his recent
term. The author wishes to thank Roberto Gargarella for his help in gathering some of the
materials used in this Article.
1. For a characterization of the process of transition to democracy, see TRANSITIONS
FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE (G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter & L. Whitehead eds. 1986); J.
LINZ, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES (1978).
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may find an escape valve through coercive interference with those
mechanisms has not vanished completely from people's minds. On
the other hand, there are countries where democratic institutions have
yet to develop more fully, as in Brazil, which requires the expansion
of elections to the office of President, or in Mexico, which awaits the
rise of political parties constituting real alternatives to the official one.
In both of these cases, however, decisive steps in this direction have
been taken recently with the enactment of a new constitution in Brazil
and the results of the last elections in Mexico.
There are several classifications of processes of transition to
democracy that may be applied to the developments in Latin
America. One of them considers the kind of factors which precipitate
the process. These factors may be endogenous ones (for example, economic hardship, social unrest, or divisions among those holding
power), or they may be exogenous factors (for example, foreign intervention or pressures of external wars, especially wars being lost). In
most cases, such as Brazil, Uruguay and Bolivia, endogenous causes
precipitated the conversion to democracy. In the case of Argentina,
however, in addition to the internal social and economic factors
which greatly discredited and isolated the military regime, one must
take into account the loss of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) War.
This is analogous to the exogenous factors that came into play when
the Greek colonels lost control of the government after their defeat in
Cyprus, and the Portuguese dictatorship fell when forced to retreat
from Angola.
Another classification of processes of transition takes into
account the modality of transmission of power from the dictators to
democratic authorities. The two main modes of transference of power
are by force, as in Venezuela, or by agreement or consent, as in Uruguay. The case of Argentina is quite atypical in this respect because
the transmission of power did not respond to either of these modes
but to one that is deemed by collapse. This occurs when a regime
loses control of a situation, leaving a vacuum that is then occupied by
the democratic forces. Though in Argentina there was some element
of consent from the military-they were the ones who called for elections under the historical Constitution of the country-the fact is that
they were compelled to do so by circumstances and by the longing of
the people to return to democratic rule. But there was also an element of mistake in the modality of transference of power in Argentina. It is not an irrelevant factor in the process of transition, for
example, that the members of the military regime made obviously
wrong calculations as to who would win the election. Indeed, the
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presidential candidate whom everyone expected to win held firmly to
the position that the amnesty law that the military had enacted made
it legally impossible to prosecute human rights violations.
Whatever their origins or modes, however, the main obstacle that
processes of transition must face in order to consolidate democratic
institutions is the curtailment of the network of de facto power relationships which corporations weave by taking advantage of the vacuum left by representatives of popular sovereignty. Under the
shadow of authoritarian rule, a number of social groups representing
particular interests carve a place for themselves after a bargaining
process which includes their offer of support for the regime. Such
groups include the military, religious organizations, coalitions of
entrepreneurs, trade unions, and even the press. Once democratic
rule is established, of course, these groups resist relinquishing their
power to the representatives of the people.
An ever expanding literature discusses the role of corporatism in
the social and political structures of Latin American countries. It
also analyzes its connection with modes of political regimes, such as
the so-called bureaucratic-authoritarianism, and with ideologies like
populism.2 The concept of "corporatism," however, has been the
source of much confusion and spurious theoretical differences. The
problem arises from two distinct meanings attributed to the word, one
more traditional and the other more technical. In the traditional
sense, corporatism (or corporativism) refers to the control exercised
by the state over organizations and interest groups such as prevailed
in Hitler's Germany. The more technical meaning, and the one commonly used in the political arena, describes the apparently contrary
phenomenon where those same organizations and interest groups
acquire considerable influence and exert persistent pressures over
state decisionmakers. While explicit definitions tend to emphasize
one meaning to the exclusion of the other, the term should encompass
both meanings when applied to Latin America.
Latin American corporatism does not rise to the level of the fascist institutional structure of legally-sanctioned exclusive organizations or interest groups, with the possible exception of Getulio
Vargas' "Estado Novo." But neither does the phenomenon that theoreticians and politicians refer to when they speak of corporatism in
Latin America reduce itself to the pressures that interest groups make
on political entities in every pluralistic society, lobbying for or against
2. See generally AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA (J.
Malloy ed. 1977) (discussing the concept of corporatism and its relationship to state and
society in Latin America).
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measures that affect them. The Latin American reality is much more
complex. It includes, among others, both features mentioned above:
There is some control by the State over interests groups and organizations, with mechanisms that affect in some measure their operation; at
the same time, however, those organizations exert enormous pressures
upon legislative and administrative agencies, and as a result, obtain
privileges and favors of various kinds. Some of these privileges
amount to a legal monopoly of the interests represented in a way that
comes close to the fascist scheme. The monopoly, however, is not
always accompanied by significant influence of the State over the
organization. In some cases, alternative legal or even constitutional
privileges short of monopoly may be granted that shield the organization from the raw competitive forces of a free market or similar mechanisms of expression of popular preference. In addition, there are
informal ways of granting favors that in many cases amount to sheer
corruption and illegality.
The complexity of corporatism in Latin America has been correctly captured by Guillermo O'Donnell's characterization of it as
"bifrontal" and "segmentary." '3 According to O'Donnell, the
bifrontal label applies .to Latin American corporatism since it has
both "statizing" 4 and "privatist" 5 components: It is statizing insofar
as there is an element of conquest and subordination by the State with
regard to organizations of civil society; it is privatist insofar as sectors
of the public institutions become "colonized" by private interest
groups and organizations. Both processes are interrelated, leading to
an interpenetration. In the words of O'Donnell: "[The] 'conquering
state' is also a 'porous state,' open at numerous interstices-informal
and institutionalized-to links which contain bidirectional processes
of control and influence, especially with the dominant classes of civil
society." 6 Bifrontality is also described by Jos6 Nun in these terms:
Now we must no longer take into account only the influence that
may exert the autonomous organizations of interests upon a fragmentary and basically passive State, but also the complex and
dense practices through which the latter has a strong impact on
those organizations . . . . This promotes a double dependency:

from the State with respect to the main interest groups which
define the social division of labor . . .and from such groups in

relation to the State insofar as it decisively conditions their activi3. O'Donnell, Corporatism and the Question of the State, in
CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA 47 (J. Malloy ed. 1977).

4. Id. at 48.
5. Id. at 64.
6. Id. at 79.

AUTHORITARIANISM

AND
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ties. This double dependency generates new networks of social
interaction .... '
The segmentary aspect of Latin American corporatism referred to by
O'Donnell is evident in that this mode of linkage between State and
society operates differently and has a systematically diverse impact on
social and institutional arrangements depending on the cleavages that
are determined mainly by social class.
Further inquiry into the etiology of this complex phenomenon
would take us beyond the scope of this paper. One of the curious
features of this sort of social structure is the circular pattern of the
causal relations involved. Often, effects are themselves the causes of
similar, though deeper and broader, effects. Suffice it to suggest here
that some of the cultural. components described by Seymour Lipset
do not seem alien to the structure of Latin American corporatism.
One example is resistance to internalization of universal standards
based on achievement and competition rather than on particular connections and status. The Castilians developed this trait through their
several century long struggle to reconquer their territory from the
Moors. Later, it was transplanted to Latin America through the
Spanish Conquest. To this day, it is reflected in the prestige of two
corporatist entities, the Church and the military, and in the pressures
against general rules of behavior and evaluation that lead to the intricate system of privileges and special status within which corporatism
flourishes.
For our present purposes, rather than speculating about the etiology of corporatism, it is more important to analyze how it is linked
with populist and authoritarian experiences in the context of Latin
American political cycles. As James M. Malloy explains:
[I]t is now evident that populism was and is based on an implicit
corporatist image of socio-political organization. With the exception of Vargas, the populist preference for a corporatist solution to
the pressures of modernization was seldom stated explicitly, but
there seems little gainsaying that populism has always shown a
high affinity for corporatist principles of organizing the relations
between state and society. 9
Malloy adds that populism, in its first phases, emphasized mobiliza7. See Nun, La Teoria Poltica y la Transicidn Democrdtica, in ENSAYOS SOBRE LA
TRANSIcI6N DEMOCRATICA EN LA ARGENTINA 15, 30 (1987).

8. See Lipset, Values, Education and Entrepreneurship,in
39, 41-43 (1986).

PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT,

THEORIES OF CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA

9. Malloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern, in
AUTHORITARIANISM AND CoRPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA

3, 12 (J. Malloy ed. 1977).
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tion in an "inclusionary" way, l0 trying to broaden the set of actors in
the political process but at the same time controlling them through
organizations "formed on sectoral and functional criteria, thereby
fragmenting support groups into parallel primary organizational
structures joined at the top by interlocking sectoral elites."'"
Distinct from the corporatism-populism formula or the relationship between corporatism and the bureaucratic-authoritarian State,
scholars often mention a third modality, the social situation that
Huntington called "praetorianism."' 12 This is a system that combines
a low degree of institutionalization with a high degree of participation
by mobile social forces. These forces penetrate the political sphere,
resulting in a confrontation among the new active social forces and
between them and the traditional establishment.' 3 Malloy described
the process as having occurred in several Latin American countries in
the late 1950's and from the mid-1960's up to the early 1970's:
An important aspect of the praetorianization of Latin American politics during this period was the fact that although the formal state apparatuses in the region grew markedly, this was
accompanied not by an increase in the power and efficiency of the
states but rather by the reverse. The continuing reality of dependence was a critical factor in the development of states that were
formerly large and powerful but in practice weak. Another factor
was a kind of de facto disaggregation of the state as various particularistic interest blocs in a sense captured relevant pieces of the
state which they manipulated to their own benefit.' 4
In the extreme configuration, this process of disaggregation of the
State affects its monopoly of coercion in such a way that social confrontations are accompanied by violence.
Guillermo O'Donnell has lucidly shown how this praetorianization of Latin American politics has led to a "social impasse" in which
no sector achieved a stable domination.' 5 The way out from this
impasse has been, according to O'Donnell, "bureaucratic-authoritarianism," which is "a system of political and economic exclusion of the
popular sector," and which "emerges after a substantial degree of
industrialization has been achieved, and also after, and to a large
extent as a consequence of, substantial political activation of the pop10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
See S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER
See O'Donnell, supra note 3,at 56.
Malloy, supra note 9, at 15.
See O'Donnell, supra note 3, at 56.

IN CHANGING SOCIETIES

195-98 (1968).
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ular sector."' 6 The task of excluding the popular sector is achieved by
abolishing its channels of participation and by controlling its organizations. 7 The bureaucratic-authoritarian State is porous to penetration by other corporations, like the military, the Church in some
cases, and an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. The latter is partly tied to
international capital and partly protected from it through privileges
and shields afforded by association with the State. This interpenetration between the bureaucratic-authoritarian State and interest groups,
with the exclusion of the popular sector, is so idiosyncratic that
authors like O'Donnell have come to think of it as a special type of
corporation. ' 8
When this kind of bureaucratic-authoritarian regime flounders
and is replaced by liberal democracies-as in the present processes of
transition in Latin America-the groups whose interests were previously favored struggle to retain as much of their privileges as possible,
competing hard with the popular sector, which has reentered the
scene. The people's reentry overcomes their prior illegitimate exclusion, only to be reinstated by organizations claiming the privileges
that the populist ideology ascribes to them.
An illustration of the challenge that corporative power poses to
democracies in transition may be accomplished through a sketch of
the way in which the present Argentinean government has to deal
with various corporations. Obviously, one of the hardest tasks that
President Alfonsin's government had to face was that of restoring the
armed forces to their proper role under the Argentine constitutional
framework. This process was made more difficult by the many
decades of direct control through absolute power, varying degrees of
association with populist governments, and longstanding enjoyment
of privileges and special status, which distinguished the military from
other public officials providing services within the State apparatus.
This prominent role had been spawned by a deep-rooted ideology
according to which the armed forces are the backbone of the nation
and have as their mission the custody of the nation's being-its very
essence-from birth. Since the Cold War, this feeling of mission had
been reinforced by allegations of a permanent communist threat, personified in a variety of internal agents.
The redefinition of the role of the Argentinean armed forces in
order to fit it within the constitutional framework was greatly
advanced by the willingness of the majority of the military to limit
16. Id. at 60.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 79.
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themselves to professional endeavors and to stop intervening in the
political arena. They had come to realize that they too were the victims of the internal conflicts. Their assumption of governmental tasks
and their participation in both the "dirty war against subversion" and
the Malvinas War had diminished their professional efficiency and
their social prestige. On the other hand, the reduced availability of
resources due to general financial hardship, which made the professional improvement of the armed forces difficult, slowed down the
process. Still, the biggest obstacle to reabsorption was the need to
prosecute and punish those members of the military who had committed human rights violations during the 1976-1983 junta rule. Additionally, President Alfonsin faced the problem of prosecuting the
military for the 1976 coup d'6tat as well as the Malvinas War.
The trials for the crimes committed in the context of the fight
against subversion were, and still are, seen in a different light by society and the government on the one hand, and by the military and
small ancillary groups on the other. From the societal and governmental points of view, though the phenomenon of left-wing terrorism
was real and abhorrent, it should have been handled according to the
rule of law. The need for suppressing terrorism in no way justified
resorting to the atrocious method of massive disappearances, leading
to widespread torture and killing, and the terrorizing of the general
population. Even if one rejects, as I do,19 a retributive view of punishment, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that these atrocities
deserve prosecution and conviction, after due process of law. This is
required in order to inculcate in the collective conscience and in the
consciences of the groups concerned that no sector of the population
stands above the law and that under no circumstances may a human
being be treated as a base object, a means to a goal, however valuable
that goal might be. The military, on the other hand, were united in an
opposite vision. In their eyes, the national essence was endangered by
both external and internal enemies who, in attacking the State, relinquished the moral respect owed to human beings.
Given these different perceptions, and taking into account the
attitudes of those whose loyalty to the democratic system was essential for preserving it, President Alfonsin's government designed a
strategy directed toward a full investigation of the facts. It conducted
trials of those mainly responsible for the atrocities, overcoming the
difficult legal obstacles to those trials, while endeavoring to narrowly
limit both the scope of the people brought to trial and the duration of
the proceedings. A presidential commission (CONADEP) success19. See Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 289 (1983).
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fully carried out the investigation of the phenomenon of the disappeared people. The Commission's findings, published in the book
Nunca Mas,2° caused a great impact on the collective conscience. In
order to overcome the legal obstacles against the trials, the government declared void the amnesty law previously enacted by the military, in accordance with a new definition of laws enacted by
authoritarian regimes, whose validity was conditioned on the moral
plausibility of their content. In addition, the government resolved a
constitutional conundrum regarding the jurisdiction of military courts
by establishing an obligatory appeal to civilian courts. Finally, an
interpretive statute delimited the broad excuse of due obedience,
found in the existing law. 21 The government was less successful, however, in its attempt to limit prosecutions and the duration of the trials.
Due to the modification of projected legislation by the Congress and
the delay of the military courts as well as some civilian courts, an
indefinite threat of prosecution loomed menacingly over a large
number of officers, generating a climate of serious unrest. At first, the
government unsuccessfully tried to overcome this negative mood by
invoking the statute of limitations, which resulted in the opposite
effect of indicting eight times more people than before. After the
events of Easter 1987, officers' fears were successfully allayed through
the law of due obedience. Though some members of the armed forces
still insist that the twenty or so convictions and the remaining forty or
fifty trials were unjust and politically motivated, the reduction in the
threat of prosecution helped to create a feeling of tranquillity and confidence, which was evidenced by the positive reaction of the bulk of
the forces against the rebellion of a fundamentalist group in January
1988. This relative calm pervaded the military echelons despite the
fact that the government stood firm in its decision to uphold the judicial verdicts regarding those mainly responsible for human rights violations. Given the circumstances, this commitment is unprecedented
in Latin America and, in relation to similar experiences, anywhere
else in the world.
The Alfonsin government took other measures in order to
achieve the democratization of the armed forces: the dismissals of
many officials of high rank; the movement of some important garrisons out of Buenos Aires; a legally, imposed promise of allegiance to
the Constitution; the prospective abolition of military jurisdiction
20. CoMIsIN NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARiCI6N DE PERSONAS, NUNCA MAS (9th ed.
1985).
21. See Nino, The Human Rights Policy of the Argentine Constitutional Government: A
Reply, ]1 YALE J. INT'L L. 217 (1985).
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over common crimes committed by the military when acting within
the scope of their duty; the transfer of control of the military-industrial complex to civil authorities; and the establishment of a law of
defense defining the military mission only in relation to external
attacks. Even though the possibility of military interference with
'democratic institutions has not been completely dispelled from people's minds, the process of making this threat increasingly remote has,
with the collaboration of many military people, made considerable
progress.
The constitutional government also had to face some issues
raised by sectors connected with the Catholic Church, even though
church members of various ranks were outspoken in their support of
democratic institutions and in their attempts to attenuate social conflicts. During the military rule, these sectors exerted great influence
over the regulation of matters of private life and the purity of social
customs. When the democratic government assumed power, one of
its first tasks was to abolish the censorship of publications, theater,
cinema exhibitions, and so forth. This new policy derived considerable support from a notable clause in the Argentine Constitution,
which states that the private actions of men that in no way harm third
parties or offend the public order or morals are reserved only to God
and exempted from the authority of the magistrates. 22 Right-wing
religious groups, however, harshly opposed these measures of liberalization, some of them labeling the system a "pornographic democracy." These groups also attacked the government because of the
initiatives it took to equalize both the rights of parents towards their
children and the status of children born in and out of wedlock. Overall, the greatest source of tension was the introduction of divorce
through the country's legislation. The Church launched a vast campaign against this change and succeeded in delaying the approval of
the law in the Senate after the Chamber of Deputies had already
enacted it. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court intervened by declaring
that the ancient law prohibiting divorce was unconstitutional, thereby
causing the expedited approval of the new divorce law. The Supreme
Court also declared unconstitutional the law criminalizing the possession of drugs for the consumption of the agent. 23 The conservative
sectors of the Church also struggled to preserve a clause in the Constitution that obligated the State to subscribe to the Catholic cult,
22. CONSTITUCI'ON NACIONAL art. 19 (Argen.), reprinted in ARGENTINE CIVIL CODE

xxxviii (F. Joannini trans. 1917).
23. I defended the same solution adopted by the Court in C. NINO, ETICA
HUMANOS 255-75 (1984).
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thereby guaranteeing financial support for the Catholic educational
system.
Some members of the oral and written press who had flourished
during the military rule also confronted the government in a corporative way. They had been exceedingly soft in their criticisms, if any, of
the military takeover and human rights violations. These same press
organizations, which had varied connections with groups in the opposition, became severe critics of the government. They reacted indignantly, for example, when the government presented to Congress a
draft of a law granting the right of reply to false and offensive comments. They balked when a judge temporarily prohibited the publication of a paid advertisement in which five thousand people praised the
crimes committed by the military junta. They even suggested legislation 24 that attempted to limit to some degree the possibility of written
press owners having total control of radio and television channels and
that attempted to establish a public network which would coexist with
an expanded private system.
The trade union organization was, without question, one of the
strongest pressure groups that confronted the government. Under the
principle of unique representation, the General Confederation of
Work (CGT) monopolizes Argentina's trade unions. The Peronist
Party, in turn, almost totally controls the CGT. Mr. Alfonsin had
attracted considerable support when, in his presidential campaign, he
denounced a pact between the unions and the military to help the
Peronists win the election. Once in office, President Alfonsin sent to
Congress a proposed law regulating the trade unions. The law
attempted to control the possible diversion of affiliates' funds, insure
the integrity of internal elections, and allow for the representation of
minorities in union boards. The government also sent to Congress a
national health insurance project designed to provide the population
with uniform medical services. The new plan would have replaced
the present scattered and unequal system provided by the unions, who
exert almost absolute discretion over the huge funds generated by
compulsive deductions from the workers' wages. But the Senate,
dominated by Peronist right-wing representatives of the poorest and
least populated provinces, rejected the trade union law by one vote.
To attain passage, the law had to be redrafted into a much weaker
regulation of the trade unions' internal life. In the same way, the Peronist Party achieved a number of relevant concessions with regard to
24. See
PROYECTO

(1987).
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the law establishing national health insurance. The trade union
movement is adamantly opposed to the economic policies of the government, having declared approximately twelve general strikes since
December 1983, and numerous local strikes, some of them for indefinite periods, which mainly affected the public sectors.
The entrepreneurial sector constitutes another source of constant
pressures directed at the government. It sought to obtain a variety of
privileges or protective measures and preserve those previously
secured. It also tried to boycott measures designed to achieve the
higher and more progressive levels of taxation that were required to
reduce the state deficit and to contain inflation. It orchestrated a vitriolic campaign against a compulsory saving plan imposed by the government and against the maintenance of retentions of partial export
earnings, which mainly affect the rural sector. In fact, industrial,
commercial, and agricultural companies and organizations have carried out an unflagging struggle to maintain privileges against open
competition in different areas.
The foregoing instances of corporative interaction with public
power are the remnants of decades of privileged status that the
authoritarian and populist governments of Argentina granted to different corporations through formal and informal means. The traditional legal system combines general rules with a patchwork of
exceptions that implicitly grant special status to some interests and to
some illegal and corrupt practices. As a result, some groups and
organizations are shielded from the mechanisms by which the general
public expresses its preferences. Corporatism of this kind is especially
dangerous during the economic crises presently endured by Argentina
and other Latin American countries, crises arising from external debt,
foreign protectionism against exports, lack of investments, and other
similar problems. Increasing levels of inflation are fueled by savage
competition among economic agents who seek to increase their representative portions of a diminishing pie. A "prisoners' dilemma" situation ensues where each participant's self-interested behavior consists
of pressing for higher nominal prices and salaries. Once this pattern
is generalized, it affects everyone's interests adversely. At the same
time, various corporations strongly oppose structural transformations
of the productive apparatus (like privatizations of public enterprises)
which are needed in order to make the economy more efficient and
competitive. As Daniel Poneman argues, this confrontation among
the corporations through the state is one of the causes of Argentinean
political instability.2 5
25. See D. PONEMAN, ARGENTINA, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL (1987).
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The long struggle by democratic forces in Argentina to wrest
political power from the corporative structure exemplifies similar
endeavors that almost all Latin American countries are facing or will
face in their respective processes of transition to democracy. The
actors are not always the same; for instance, the Church does not
have the same role in Chile as it does in Argentina, and the trade
unions in Argentina have a different position than those in Brazil.
But the script is repeated in each country because the formal reestablishment of democratic rule is not sufficient to break down the citadels
of power relationships built up during the dictatorship periods.
Corporative pressures are an important factor underlying the
prevalence in Latin America of two schemes of distribution of political power. According to the first model, there is a cyclic instability
that generally exists during populist, praetorian, 'authoritarian, and
sometimes liberal democratic periods. These political cycles coincide
with economic cycles of expansion and recession and allow different
corporative sectors to achieve power successively and to obtain privileges that are later curtailed but not altogether abolished. The second
scheme is one of conditioned democracies. Democracies in this
scheme achieve stability through an enduring truce with corporative
powers. Preservation of corporative privileges, however, limits the
full workings of democratic mechanisms such as broad public discussion, widespread and alert public participation and representation,
and complete independence of Congress and the judiciary.
II.

CORPORATISM, POPULAR PARTICIPATION, AND
POLITICAL PARTIES

The rather extended foregoing discussion has provided an overview of corporatism in Latin America. Its purpose has been to
advance the first premise of my argument-that the main obstacle
that the process of transition to a consolidated democracy in Latin
American countries must overcome is the interpenetration of corporative power relations, which are remnants of previous populist and
authoritarian stages, within the political structure of a liberal democracy. This Section will be brief because my second premise requires
far less empirical support and instead appeals to the understanding of
the foundations of the democratic process. I propose that the
strengthening of the workings of democracy against corporative powers requires broadening direct popular participation in the decisionmaking and control of governmental action. The best method for
achieving this goal is to perfect the mechanisms of representation and
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strengthen political parties, which are themselves internally democratic and open, disciplined, and ideologically defined.
The phenomenon of corporatism in Latin America is an indication that the task of the French Revolution was not completed in
these remote lands. The famous words of Le Chapelier in the Constitutional Assembly of 1791 are still significant in this context:
There must be no more guilds in the State, but only the individual
interest of each citizen and the general interest. No one shall be
allowed to arouse in any citizen any kind of intermediate interest
and to separate him from the public weal through the medium of
corporate interests.2 6
Of course, this ideal vision of the individual standing alone before the
State has, over time, proven disastrous. The lone individual was left
unprotected from other individuals who were all too powerful because
of natural or social circumstances, particularly if the status quo
remained intact. This led to a process of reassessment of the value of
associations as shields for individuals in the process of private negotiation. Still, the ideal of the French Revolution, that those associations should not intermediate between the individual and the State, is
of great value. The notion of the citizen, who is not identified with
any interest but is free to choose and has an equal voice in expressing
his choice, is one of the hallmarks of liberal democracy.
This ideal is conditioned on a concept of democracy that rejects
its reduction to a conglomeration of interests working similarly to the
market or as a mechanism for replacing elites.27 I have elsewhere
attempted to explain the moral superiority of democracy as a regimented mode of the practice of moral discourse by which we try to
solve conflicts in the light of universal, general, and public principles
that would be accepted in ideal conditions of impartiality, rationality,
and knowledge.2 8 Democracy substitutes simple majoritarian decisions for the requirement of a unanimous consensus in the common
and non-regimented practice of moral discourse. This substitution
weakens the force of the presumption that the result of the procedure
is morally valid because it would be accepted under ideal conditions
(given the functional equivalence between unanimity and impartiality). Still, democracy preserves some epistemological value, because it
is to be presumed that the need to justify one's decision to others and
to get as much support as possible for one's position generates a ten26. See R.

BENDIX, NATION BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP

(1964) (quoting Le Chapelier).

27. For an account of these theories, see W. NELSON, ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY

(1980).
28. See C. NINO, supra note 23, at 225-54.
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dency towards impartiality which makes it more reliable than other
decision processes.
This view of democracy presupposes that individuals, who are
the basic moral persons, are its natural agents and that the freedom
and equality of their intervention in the democratic process should be
preserved and expanded, which is not the case when corporations
intermediate. Besides, this conception of democracy as a substitute
for moral discourse presupposes that the primary objects of decision
in the democratic process are not crude interests, but principles that
legitimize a certain balance of interests from an impartial point of
view. Therefore, corporations that agglutinate people around common interests and not around moral views about how to deal with
interests cannot be the protagonists of the democratic process.
Corporations prosper whenever democracy departs more than is
necessary from the strictures of the original practice of moral discourse in such a way that public debate becomes restricted and
debased, the power of participants actually to influence decisions
becomes too unequal, and participation of interested people becomes
narrow and weaker. Therefore, in order to strengthen the democratic
power of common citizens against that of corporations, it is crucial to
broaden and deepen popular participation in discussion and decisionmaking, even by imposing compulsory voting. I believe this measure
to be justified as legitimate paternalism, given the coordination
problems that arise when many individuals belonging to specific sectors of society think that their particular vote is not essential for their
group's interests to be taken into account.29 Furthermore, the mechanisms of representation, necessary in large and complex societies, are
prone to be subverted by corporative power. There is the possibility
of corruption of the representatives, their blindness regarding the
interests of the people they represent when noisily opposed by corporations, and the apathy of the people represented. For these reasons,
it is essential to widen the ways of direct participation by the people
whose interests are at stake, be it through general procedures like referenda or popular consultations or through decentralized decisions
that allow the people concerned to participate directly.
Jos6 Nun correctly points out that one of the ways of channelling
corporative power is by confronting it with a democratic unity, which
must be articulated through multiple forms of direct or participative
29. See Nino, El Voto Obligatorio, in
DEMOCRACIA, REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL:

CONSOLIDACI6N DE LA DEMOCRACIA

CONSEJO PARA
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DE LA
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219 (1987).
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democracy.3" This should attenuate the confiscation of spheres of
influence by representative democracy in favor of elites. In the same
sense, but referring mainly to business corporations, Benjamin Barber
asserts:
If the corporation is not to defeat democracy, then democracy
must defeat the corporation-which is to say that the curbing of
monopoly and the transformation of corporatism is a political, not
an economic, task. Democracy proclaims the priority of the political over the economic; the modern corporation rebuts that claim
by its very existence. But unitary democracy [meaning one that
seeks consensus by a process of a cohesive identification with the
community] is too easily assimilated to the unitary aspects of corporatism, with possible results that can only be called fascistic.
And liberal democracy is too vulnerable-its citizens too passive
and its ideas of freedom and individualism too illusory-to recognize, let alone to battle with, the mammoth modem corporation
that has assumed the identity and ideology of the traditional family
firm.
Strong democracy [that is participative democracy] has no
qualms about inventing and transforming society in the name of a
democratically achieved vision, and it may be able to engage the
multinational corporation in a meaningful struggle. Yet the corporate society and the corporate mentality themselves stand in the
way of the idea of active citizenship that is indispensable to strong
democracy.3
Moreover, direct participation by the population in the decisions
that affect them may help overcome the social tension associated with
the so called "crisis of democracy" which arises from increasingly
unsatisfied demands fueled in part by corporative struggles. In opposition to the recommendation of the Trilateral Commission, which
advocated countering such crises by restraining discussion and participation, and faithful to the idea that "the evils of democracy are cured
with more democracy," I think such crises call for the broadening of
direct participation. 32 This provides an escape valve for social pressures and contributes to limit them insofar as the people come to
understand the reasons for the scarcity of the resources available to
satisfy competing demands.
The vision of democracy as a regimented modality of discussion
over moral principles to regulate conflicts allows us to qualify the lib30. Id.
BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 257 (1984).
32. See Nino, La ParticipacidnComo Remedio a la Liamada "Crisis de la Democracia,"in
ALFONSIN: DISCURSOS SOBRE EL DISCURSO 123, 133 (1986).

31. B.
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eral rejection of any intermediaries between the individual and the
State. It is obvious that there is an exception exemplified by organizations which agglutinate people not on the basis of crude interests, but
because of principles, ideologies, and moral outlooks. Politicalparties
are such exeptions when they are the standard bearers of programs for
the organization of society on the basis of fundamental principles of
political morality. They are indispensable in a modem and large society, not only because they nurture those principles in professional politicians, who purport to put them into practice if duly elected, but also
because they exempt individuals from the task of justifying their votes
before each other on the basis of principles, stated or otherwise; it is
enough to vote for a party which organizes its proposals on the basis
of public and general principles. Political parties are the antibodies
that protect democratic health against corporative power because the
respective raison d'etre of political parties and corporative power are
exactly antithetic. Political parties defend principles which legitimize
a certain composition of interests from an impartial viewpoint, while
corporations represent crude particular interests. For example, Juan
Carlos Portantiero describes how inflation leads to, and is obviously
caused by, a displacement of political parties by corporations:
Perhaps the most evident institutional effect of inflationary practices consists in the perverse dialectics-for democratic stabilitywhich it establishes between corporations and parties. Carrying on
the hypothesis further away, we would say that, in a vicious circle
which reproduces itself, the relation between strong corporations
and a weak system of parties, the institutional cause of inflation, is
in its turn producer of the ungovernability of the social mechanism
of accumulation insofar as it blocks the possibility of elaborating
consensus and replacing it by perverse and momentaneous equilibria ....

333

This deterioration of the role of political parties in favor of corporations also involves the erosion of the importance of the natural
arena for those parties-Parliament. Corporations prefer to exert
pressures and eventually achieve agreements in the quiet offices of the
administration rather than in the noisy, pluralistic, and more public
parliamentary corridors. In addition, there is the tendency of administrations to preserve some of the practices inherited from previous
authoritarian governments. For instance, the Central Bank in Argentina has powers which are equivalent to those that the Constitution
reserves for Congress, such as granting special lines of credit that, in
33. Portantiero, La Crisis de un Rdgimen: Una Mirada Retrospectiva, in ENSAYOS SOBRE
LA TRANSICION DEMOCRATICA EN LA ARGENTINA

57, 76 (1987).
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essence, are subsidies. These powers, taken away from Parliament by
the administration, come with a vengeance. They become subject to
corporativist pressures, yet lack the protective shield of a consensus
previously worked out with other political sectors.
It must be kept in mind, however, that fortifying political parties
and the parliamentary institutions in order to protect the democratic
system from corporative power will work only to the extent that these
entities do not become transformed into corporations themselves,
developing elites with distinctive interests and prone to compromise
with members of traditional corporative groups. This transformation
occurs when parties weaken their ideological commitment, do not
promote debates on essential questions of political morality, block
channels of participation, operate through methods of patronage and
clientelism, or resort to personalism and caudillism. When parties
become corporations, Parliament becomes weakened by the lack of
representativity, by a discourse that is both ideologically vacuous and
detached from the experiences and interests of the people represented,
and by a general appearance of opacity and self-service.
To avoid this danger, the strengthening of the political parties
and Parliament in order to curtail corporative power requires opening
the parties to broad popular participation, promoting permanent
political debates within them, perfecting the internal democratic
mechanisms for choosing party leaders and candidates, and giving a
public accounting of the management of funds. It is also important
that the electoral system combine the need for promoting party cohesion and ideological identity with the need for the voter to identify
with individual deputies, rather than voting for the party slate. A
mixed electoral system incorporating proportional representation
with individual candidate selection may satisfy both needs. This concept can be extended to parliamentary procedures, which should combine party discipline with a degree of autonomy for individual
deputies.
III.

STRONG DEMOCRACY AND PRESIDENTIALISM

To summarize, my first premise is that corporative political
power is one of the greatest obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in Latin America. My second premise is that one of the most
important contributive factors to the curtailment of corporatism is
broad and deep popular participation in decisionmaking and control
led by strong participative and ideologically committed political parties and parliamentary bodies. This, following Barber, may be
deemed "strong democracy." My final premise is this: Strong
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democracy is functionally incompatible with the extreme forms of
presidentialism typical of Latin American constitutions; when presidentialism is not accompanied by limited or conditioned forms of
democracy, 34 tensions are generated which often lead to the breakdown of the institutional system.
Before arguing in support of this premise, it is necessary to comment on a methodological point of great importance. There is a longstanding disagreement among philosophers, jurists, sociologists, and
political scientists regarding the capacity of law and institutional
design to influence social changes and affect patterns of social behavior. In the field of law, this disagreement can be illustrated by the
paradigmatic positions of two great jurists: Friedrick Karl von Savigny and Jeremy Bentham. Savigny professed an historicist conception of law, whereby the true law is found and not made; it is found in
the spirit of the people and in social customs. 35 Thus, under Savigny's
view, legislation and institutional design should be extremely cautious
and follow, rather than promote, social development. Bentham, on
the other hand, was a fervent believer in law as an instrument of social
engineering, devoting his life to writing codes for different nations. 36
His preaching, for example, had influence in the modern conception
of Parliament as an active body which can achieve social reforms
through legislation.37
In the field of political science, there is basically the same disagreement. On the one hand, there are the currents of thought that
O'Donnell calls "societalist," which are in part influenced by Marxist
assumptions and which, according to him, "deny or ignore the specificity of the problem of the state as a societal factor endowed with
varying, but rarely insignificant, capabilities for autonomous impulse
and initiative." 3 At the other extreme, there are "politicist" conceptions which ascribe to the state a disproportionate weight in the causation of observed and recommended social changes. Reality appears
to lie somewhere between the two extremes. Indeed, it is undeniable
both that the law and institutional design have on many occasions
considerable impact on social developments and that society is not a
34. I differentiate the two forms because the limitation of democracy does not always give
place to its conditioning by corporations.
35. See generally SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW (W. Holloway trans.
1862) (discussing the nature and origin of law).
36. See generally L. HUME, BENTHAM AND BUREAUCRACY (1981) (discussing Bentham's
jurisprudence and theories of codification).
37. For an account of this controversy, see C. NINO, INTRODUCCION AL ANALISIS DEL
DERECHO 299-305 (1983).
38. See id. at 51-52 (quoting G. O'Donnell).
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malleable subject which adapts plastically to deliberate legislation,
being subject to many other causal factors besides the legal
component.
The very subject of my last premise affirms the above eclectic
methodological position. On the one hand, the way in which it was
stated left room for the intervention of factors besides the legal and
political, such as cultural factors, because even when it may be true
that a strong democracy is contributive to the containment of corporative power, a limited democracy does not always lead to corporatism, and hence to conditioned democracy, in the Latin American
way. This is obviously the case of the United States in which the
power of corporations is a complex phenomenon, but the phenomenon is not assimilable to Latin America. On the other hand, the
adoption of the presidentialist system of government is undoubtedly
correlated, when joined with some conditions to be studied, to the
recurrence of some social effects leading to institutional disruptions.
In this respect, a study by Professor Fred W. Riggs, which is
prefaced by these remarks, is extremely revealing:
One starting point for analysis might be the proposition that some
33 Third World countries (but only one in the First or Second!)
have adopted presidentialist constitutions. Almost universally
these polities have endured disruptive catastrophes, usually in the
form of one or more coups d'&at whereby conspiratorial groups of
military officers seize power, suspend the constitution, displace
elected officials, impose martial law and promote authoritarian
rule: recent examples in Korea, South Vietnam, Liberia and many
Latin American countries come to mind....
By contrast, almost two-thirds of the Third World countries
which adopted parliamentary constitutions, usually based on British or French models, have maintained their regimes and avoided
the disruptions typical of all American-type systems .. .
Riggs undertakes to explain this connection between presidentialism and instability in Third World countries, as contrasted with
the only stable presidentialist democracy (the United States), by taking into account not environmental or contextual features but systemic ones. These are features of the institutional design and
practices that, because not written into the Constitution itself, he
deems "para-constitutional." Riggs mentions several problems that a
presidentialist regime has to face-executive-legislative confrontations, paralysis of the assembly, weakness of the party system, and the
39. Riggs, The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-constitutionalPractices, 9
INT'L POL.

Sci.

REV.

247, 249 (1988).

1989]

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

politics of the courts-all of which have led to collapse in more than
thirty of such regimes outside the United States. He analyzes a
number of para-constitutional variables that differ between the United
States and those countries, thereby explaining their diverse stability.
Let us mention first those variables that have a direct connection with
the existence of a strong democracy, as characterized in the previous
section.
Riggs refers to different factors which determine that political
parties in a presidential system both tend to be weak and are required
to be weak for the system to work smoothly. One factor is that parties in a presidential system are difficult to organize and perpetuate in
a cohesive way because they must try to form coalitions prior to elections in order to have some chance of achieving a majority. In a parliamentary system, by contrast, the parties can go into the elections
following well-defined programs and then try to form coalitions in
Parliament after the elections are over. A second factor which allows
presidentialism to work in the United States and which involves a
weakening of parties is the lack of party discipline, which according
to Riggs may be "a necessary condition for the success of a presidentialist regime, whereas if party discipline were enforced, the capacity
of government to govern would be severely impaired whenever the
president belonged to one party and the opposition party had a congressional majority."' This is connected with another para-constitutional feature of the American system, the electoral system based on
uninominal constituencies, which affects party discipline, especially
insofar as it combines with a decentralized pattern of party organization. Another factor that weakens political parties within a presidentialist system is the effect that being defeated in elections has upon the
parties. Many of the nonpolitical functions that parties perform in a
parliamentary system cannot be carried out in a presidentialist system
because parties are not tied to a more or less stable representation in
Parliament, but they are instead largely affected by the fate of their
presidential candidate; when he loses, there is little incentive to
remain faithful to the party. This is connected with a final feature
noted by Riggs: Because parties in a presidential system cannot be
very ideologically committed but must present wide and vague
stances and must make many compromises in order to win support
for their presidential candidates from many social sectors, they
awaken little enthusiasm from voters, most of whom do not identify
themselves with any party but simply choose the lesser evil. In sum,
the presidential system faces the following dilemma with regard to
40. Id. at 260.
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political parties: The parties become weaker and weaker as a result of
the nature of political competition under this system that, given some
other social and cultural conditions, may make ample room for the
corporative exercise of their political muscle; otherwise, if some other
factors operate to preserve their strength, as in the case of Argentina,
the parties contribute to the generation of the tensions which are typical of the presidentialist system, such as blockages between the powers and exhaustion of the figure of the President.
The other variable in which the American system differs from
most of the rest of the presidentialist regimes, and which is directly
connected with the previous characterization of a strong democracy,
is popular participation, mainly through the exercise of the right to
vote. Riggs is very explicit about this point:
One of the paradoxes and limitations of a presidentialist system of
government appears to be voter apathy. Despite its long history
and the apparent commitment of Americans to representative
democracy, voting turnout is notably less in the USA than in virtually all parliamentary governments. We normally assume, of
course, that popular participation in elections is necessary for the
health of democratic institutions. However, sad to say, a low voter
turnout seems to be a cost entailed by various para-constitutional
aspects of a presidentialist system. In addition, it could even be a
para-constitutional feature....
... The higher the level of popular participation in voting, the
greater would be the contradiction between the interests that
finance political campaigns and the interests of the voting majority.
The presidentialist system, therefore, works most smoothly when
voting participation remains fairly low ....
A conspicuous reason for the skewed distribution of voters
can be found in the substance of party platforms. In order to
secure the support of a majority of voters-a majority required by
the arithmetic of a winner-take-all presidential competition-these
platforms have to take ambiguous stands on many issues that
divide public opinion. But such issues are also likely to attract the
greatest interest, especially that of poor people ....
*.. The price for high voter turnout is lively and divisive political controversy, whereas low turnout is linked to apathy and indifference .... [T]o put the negative case, mass participation is less
threatening to the survival of parliamentary than of presidentialist
regimes.41
These words from Professor Riggs underscore a point of great
41. Id. at 263-64 (footnotes omitted).
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importance to the comparative study of the almost uniquely successful American presidential system and the unsuccessful ones, like the
Argentinean system. In the United States, the low voter turnout,
mainly among the poor and less educated, has a refeeding effect. The
presidential candidates concentrate their efforts on luring potential
voters by taking into account the common interests of those expected
to vote, which are possibly contradictory to those of most traditional
nonvoters. This is done in very general and vague terms, however, in
order to avoid stressing the differences among voters. This nonspecificity reduces the candidates' appeal to nonvoters. There is little
reason to choose among apparently similar platforms. In any event,
the nonvoters undergo a typical "prisoner's dilemma" line of reasoning, balancing the cost of voting-higher for poorer people-against
the perception that their vote will not make a difference. By contrast,
compulsory voting in Argentina was introduced by law in 1912. In
the ensuing election of 1916 and until the present, the voting turnout
more than tripled in comparison with elections held under voluntary
voting. This forced electoral participation-first, by the middle class,
mainly through the Radical Party, and later by the working class,
mainly through the Peronist Party-has resulted in those parties successively being the only winners of free elections, thereby causing a
permanent displacement of the conservative parties, which had held
power prior to 1916. In spite of the vagueness of the candidates' proposals and the need for compromise in order to achieve a wider basis
of support, a relatively high level of interest and even enthusiasm has
been preserved through emotional factors, like that surrounding the
controversy between Peronists and anti-Peronists. Riggs' suggestion
regarding the threatening effect of high levels of participation on a
presidentialist system seems to be confirmed by the considerable political stability in Argentina prior to 1916 (from the enactment of the
Constitution in 1853/60) and the extreme instability afterwards.
Obviously, those displaced by the results of massive voting sought
other channels to power.
In other words, the two features which characterize strong
democracy and which serve to protect it against the phenomenon of
corporativism that has arisen in Latin America, due to different and
complex factors, are absent in the most successful presidentialist system in the world, thereby contributing to its success. Furthermore,
the existence of strong parties and widespread popular participation
may be largely responsible for the functional difficulties that are currently encountered by the presidentialist system.
First, the presidential system of government works, as Juan Linz

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:129

says, as a zero-sum game in which all that one party gains the other
loses.4 2 The parties are trapped in a dynamic of confrontation to win
the presidency. This is an indivisible, unipersonal position, lasting for
a rigidly fixed and usually long period of time and concentrating in
the holder of the position an enormous amount of power, particularly
the ability to fill numerous public posts. This pits parties against each
other in a savage competition for power that may lead to heavy bloodshed, as happened in Colombia thirty years ago, before the liberalconservative pact. This is not surprising given the fact that a large
political party needs access to power in order to preserve its cadres of
professional politicians, and two or three presidential periods outside
the main center of power may easily prove fatal for the preservation of
a party.
Second, the presidential system implies the division of the expression of popular sovereignty between the President and Parliament,
each of whom may exercise a sort of veto power over some decisions
of the other. When each of these expressions is controlled by a different political party, usually as a result of majorities established over
time, the dynamics of confrontation between the parties is escalated to
the relation between the powers of the State, leading to fights and
stalemates. This danger is avoided in the United States through the
weakness of the parties and the help of the electoral system. The
President collects majorities from outside his own party and is able to
govern even when supported only by a minority faction in one or both
houses of Congress. The situation is quite different in countries like
Argentina where the discipline promoted'by proportional representation enhances the traditional strength of the parties. For example,
opposition parties blocked or delayed several important initiatives
advanced by the ruling Radical Party. Even when they' could not
gather a majority vote against a given proposal, they utilized dilatory
parliamentary maneuvers, such as lack of a quorum for holding a session. To meet the quorum requirements, the ruling party sometimes
had to yield unrelated advantages. Similarly, the Peronist administrations of the provinces suffered legislative blockages. The worst effect
of these confrontations between the administration and Parliament in
a presidential system is that the antagonism leads to a complete stalemate because Parliament lacks the power to influence the course of
the administration.
42. See Linz, Democracia Presidencial o Parlementaria, Hay Alguna Diferencia?, in
CONSEJO PARA LA CONSOLIDACI6N DE LA DEMOCRACIA, PRESIDENCIALISMO VS.
PARLAMENTARISMO: MATERIALES PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LA REFORMA CONSTITUTIONAL

19, 26 (1988).
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Third, even when the parties are not seriously antagonistic, the
presidential system makes it very difficult for them to collaborate in
the same government. This collaboration is often needed in the face
of a national crisis, an internal or external war, or threats of corporative power. If all the major parties support the same presidential candidate, the working of the system is affected because there is no real
opposition remaining and no prospect of genuine debate. If, on the
other hand, the President of the victorious party invites the others to
collaborate in his cabinet, the vote of the people who brought that
party to power seems to be somehow denaturalized.
Fourth, the confrontation between the parties often leads to the
political exhaustion of the President long before the expiration of his
term. This weakening usually coincides with the point of retraction of
the economic cycles of expansion and recession typical of Latin
American economies. The rigidity of the presidential term of government makes the political crisis boil over, rather than channelling the
discontent through some legitimate escape valve. The President often
reaches a point at which he still has an enormous set of formal powers, but he has lost credibility, popularity, and parliamentary support.
The only way of replacing him, other than by his voluntary resignation, would be through impeachment. This process is almost impossible to carry out since it requires an accusation of misconduct and the
vote of a qualified majority, including members of the President's
party. The latter, of course, are usually not willing to commit such
political suicide. The President himself is not usually inclined to
resign because he feels that he has a mandate for the whole period and
he does not want to end his political career as a historical failure.
Argentina went through this experience in 1976. According to some
observers, the military coup could have been avoided, or at least
delayed, if Isabel Peron had been replaced by resignation or impeachment. Alternatively, had there been another system of government,
she could have been confined to more circumscribed functions and an
acceptable head of government could have been appointed.
The foregoing discussion offers support for my third premise:
The elements which may make democracy strong against corporatist
pressures-wide popular participation and ideologically disciplined
and broadly participative political parties-are ill-suited to a presidentialist system because they generate tensions which are difficult
to handle and therefore aggravate the inherent difficulties of
democracy.
The line of reasoning which I have expounded may be summarized as follows:
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(1) One of the main challenges faced in the process of transition
to a fully consolidated democracy in Latin America is the need to
overcome the network of power relations and privileges that different
corporations have established during previous periods-generally
bureaucratic-authoritarian and, sometimes, populist periods. The
corporations try to preserve these power relations and privileges
through the transition, generating distortions and inflationary crises,
which exert pressures upon the democratic system.
(2) The best means for countering this corporative power is by
returning to a polity governed by universal and impersonal principles
where individual citizens, who are not identified with any particular
interests but preserve the capacity of adopting different ones, make
choices in a process of public justification and dialogue. In practical
terms, this requires promoting broad popular participation in voting,
discussion, and direct decisions and including political parties organized on the basis of principles and programs, with active and participative members, and with an internal democracy whose results are
then enforced in a disciplined way.
(3) A strong democracy thus characterized, however, is functionally incompatible with a presidentialist system of government,
which tends to weaken political parties. When political parties
remain strong due to diverse historical and cultural factors, the difficulties which are inherent in the presidentialist system-the erosion of
the presidential figure, blockages between powers, difficulties in forming coalitions-are seriously aggravated, thereby jeopardizing the stability of the system.
The conclusion that one may derive from these premises is obvious: The presidentialist system of government under present conditions in Latin America, which include the phenomenon of
corporatism, is an obstacle for the consolidation of democratic institutions. The transition to democracy would be considerably facilitated
by constitutional reforms which substitute relevant parliamentary
mechanisms for the existing presidentialist schemes.
In the last section of this Article, I shall briefly survey the debate
over this kind of constitutional reform in Latin America, the previous
and present attempts to carry it out, and the obstacles found along the
way.
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IV.

IDEAS AND ATTEMPTS AT REFORMING THE
PRESIDENTIALIST SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA

Despite the setbacks mentioned above, many people and groups
are deeply attached to the presidential system of government in Latin
America. Some right-wing adherents, for example, argue in favor of
the presidential system on the basis of tradition and the widespread
desire to seek strong leaders supposedly imbedded in the Hispanic
mentality. I find these arguments weak because traditions are not
unchangeable and have no inherent value, especially when they have
led to obviously evil results over a long stretch of history. Furthermore, the tradition in Latin America is more reflective of the coup
d'&at than of the presidential system. As for the alleged Hispanic
preference for strong leaders, this tendency should be institutionally
counteracted rather than promoted. In fact, the postulation is rather
dubious, given the easy adaptation of countries like Spain to a parliamentary system (after forty years of a caudillo's rule), and the adoption of strong leaders by non-Hispanic nations.
Some conservatives advance a stronger argument-that a parliamentary or mixed system of government would lead to very unstable
administrations in Latin America, given the climate of economic crisis, social strife, and political tensions. The answer to these arguments is that there are mechanisms, such as constructive censure, that
strongly limit the downfall of governments, as has been shown in the
countries where they are in force, such as Germany and Spain.
Besides, and more importantly, very often the circumstances that lead
to a change of government in a parliamentary system are the same
ones that in a presidential system lead to the exhaustion of the presidential figure, to a stalemate between the administration and parliament, to a harsh confrontation between the parties; moreover, they
are often the circumstances that create the vacuum that is filled by
corporative power indirectly or through military rule.
The left has also defended the presidential system. Quite
recently, the Brazilian Harvard Law School Professor, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, who is tied to the leadership of the Brazilian Working
Party (PDT), argued in a series of articles4 3 for the preservation of the
presidential system in his country. He did so, however, with some
important variations, particularly the ability of the President to dissolve Congress and the ability of Congress to call for new presidential
43. See, e.g., Unger, La Frma de Gobierno Que Conviene at Brasil, in
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elections. The essence of his argument is that the only process apt to
break the network of power relations of conservative party leaders
and to mobilize the masses after a program of structural transformation is a presidential election. But this same argument brings out one
of the main weaknesses of the presidential system. When a wide consensus exists over a certain program and who should carry it out, any
system would work. The presidential system would add only the risk
of abuses against unrepresented minorities. But problems arise when,
as often happens in Latin America, there is no such consensus. The
presidential system is the least capable of promoting its formation.
On the contrary, it promotes dissent, even between parties holding
similar views, because of the struggle required to win the presidency.
If a president with a narrow electoral base tries to enforce a program
of deep structural transformation, as President Allende tried to do in
Chile, he will be confronted by powerful forces of the opposition and
corporative groups. As Professor Lijphart has argued, a parliamentary system is more apt to govern societies in which there are no definite majorities in support of a program, but a consensus has to be
worked out." I can predict that in the case of Argentina, for example, any program of deep structural transformation cannot be carried
out without the support of the two majoritarian parties, who confront
the corporative pressures seeking to maintain the status quo. This
combined support is impossible to obtain, however, within a presidential system. On the other hand, the progressive sector of each party
might well reach an agreement in Parliament to support a program of
transformation through a collaborative government if the struggle for
the presidency were to cease.
Nevertheless, a third alternative is available: a mixed system
which preserves some of the advantages of presidentialism, thereby
avoiding a deep break with tradition, and at the same time, neutralizing its major handicaps. A mixed system of government is one that
combines a popularly elected president and his cabinet with some parliamentary responsibility. Mixed systems may be graded along a continuum that depends on the extent of the powers of the President visa-vis those of the Prime Minister and the degree of intervention of
Parliament in the formation of government. Furthermore, it is possible to conceive a dynamic mixed system where the comparative real
powers of the President and the Prime Minister would vary according
to such factors as the support that the President has in Parliament
44. Lijphart, Democratizaci6ny Modelos DemocrdticosAlternativos, in CONSEJO PARA LA
CONSOLIDACION DE LA DEMOCRACIA,
PRESIDENCIALISMO VS. PARLAMENTARISMO:
MATERIALES PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LA REFORMA CONSTITUTIONAL 5, 17 (1988).
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and in the electorate at large, the cohesiveness of his party, his personality, and so forth. This is achieved if the elected President is assigned
only narrowly defined powers: the dissolution of the lower house of
Parliament, limited veto power, the appointment of high, nonpolitical
positions-judges, ambassadors, and generals-and the discretion to
appoint and remove the Prime Minister, who is the chief of government. The lower house would retain some restricted power to censure
the Prime Minister. Under this system, when the President has a
majority in the House of Representatives or in the electorate, despite
the fact that all the normal functions of government are centered in
the Prime Minister, the President can exercise considerable control
over the main policies of government through the threat of removal of
the Prime Minister. But once the President loses the majoritarian
support of the lower house or the electorate, he must step backward
into his circumscribed but important duties, negotiating with the
House for the formation of a new government that would have considerable independence from him and yet would not interfere with his
figurehead role.
This versatile form of government may be suited to Latin
America's well-known political cycles-somewhat connected with
economic cycles-because it is flexible enough to handle widely different situations. When the President is backed by a strong consensus in
the earlier part of the cycle, the system works like a presidential one.
When the consensus breaks down, or if it was never achieved by the
President, the system avoids wearing out the presidential figure and
brings the opposition under the control of Congress, thereby operating in a parliamentary fashion.
Among the approximately 200 constitutions with which Latin
American countries have experimented-indeed an overproduction in
this branch of industry-there have been some relevant variations and
some different approaches to parliamentarism within a general presidentialist trend. In general, the first constitutional movement in the
region consisted of adopting the United States' system with certain
modifications addressed at giving the presidency even more strength.
To put it another way, the trend was to ascribe more powers to the
President with less parliamentary control and to extend the term of
office, though with a prohibition on reelection. Afterwards, a contrary movement for attenuating the strength of the President evolved
in different countries at various times.
Brazil provides a remarkable case. Its first republican constitution dates from 1891. According to Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco,
American presidentialism clearly exerted an influence on the constitu-
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tional assembly. 45 Hence, the 1891 Constitution introduced "constitutional presidentialism" in Brazil. It included a neat presidentialist
system, with a four-year term for Parliament. The Movement of 1930
led to the Constitution of 1934. Its most remarkable change was to
adopt the principles of the so-called "social constitutionalism." In
1937, Getulio Vargas promoted a new constitution to establish his
"Estado Novo." This constitution granted to the President a very
extensive list of powers which even included numerous alternatives
for intervening in the provincial states.
In 1946, after the military coup which overthrew Getulio Vargas,
Brazil enacted a new constitution. In the constitutional convention
there was some support for the introduction of a parliamentary system, but it was not enough for the proposal to succeed. In the end, a
classical presidentialist system was adopted, though it greatly curtailed the powers granted to the President by the previous constitution. Even the procedure for impeachment was considerably
facilitated, requiring only an absolute majority of the House of Deputies for the accusation, a trial before the Supreme Court of the Senate
according to the case and following a procedure to be established by
law, and rather broad motives for the impeachment.
As is well documented by Jorge Vanossi,46 in August 1961, a
crisis occurred at the end of President Kubitschek's term and upon
the untimely resignation of newly elected President Janio Quadros.
The military vetoed the possibility of Vice President Joao Goulart,
who was abroad at the time, assuming the presidency. The President
of the House of Deputies, Ranieri Mazzilli, assumed it temporarily.
He communicated to Congress the demands of the armed forces and
the possibility of a compromise, accepted by Goulart himself, which
consisted of amending the Constitution in order to introduce a parliamentary form of government. This form of government was based on
ideas discussed upon the enactment of previous constitutions and on a
project which Deputy Raul Pilla had presented only a month before.
With the support of the influential Senator Afonso Arinos de Melo
Franco (a previous defender of presidentialism), the assembly of both
houses of Congress adopted a specially expeditious procedure for discussing the amendment. A special committee produced a dispatch.
Deputy Pilla proposed an amendment. The assembly ultimately
approved a regime which was markedly parliamentary: The President was not elected directly by the people but by the Congress in a
45. See A. DE MELO FRANCO, THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES OF BRAZIL: HISTORICAL

SYNTHESIS (1977).
46. J. VANOSSI, PRESIDENCIALISMO Y PARLAMENTARISMO, EN EL BRAZIL (1964).
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joint session of both houses, and he lost traditional powers, such as
the position of chief of the armed forces, the ability to determine the
internal and external policies of government that related to legislative
initiative, and the powers granted in a state of siege concerning the
intervention in the provincial states. Power was vested in the President of the Council of Ministers, who had both political responsibility
over the government and federal administration. The President proposed to the House of Deputies the candidate for President of the
Council of Ministers. The House could accept or reject the proposal
of the President, but if more than three proposals were rejected, the
next one had to come from an absolute majority of the Senate. This
body could also oppose the nomination of the President by a twothirds vote, which could in turn be reversed by an absolute majority of
the House of Deputies. If the House overthrew three successive
Councils of Ministers, the President was to dissolve the House and
call for new elections. This system lasted for 495 days. President
Goulart launched a vocal campaign for the return to presidentialism,
and in 1962, Congress enacted a law, "Capanema-Valadares," calling
for a referendum to decide whether the parliamentary regime would
stay. The results of the referendum were decisively favorable to the
return of presidentialism, and on January 24, 1963, after the revocation of the previous amendment to the Constitution, President Goulart assumed full powiers. He was deposed in the following year,
however, by a military coup that established an authoritarian government that lasted for approximately twenty years.
Once a democratic government was established in 1985, the idea
of enacting a new constitution emerged. The constitutional convention went to work in 1986. A project, approved by the Committee of
Consolidation, would have established a semi-parliamentarian regime.
According to this plan, the President of the Republic had the power
to appoint and to remove the Prime Minister and, pursuant to the
latter's proposal, the ministers of the Cabinet. The President also had
the following powers: to appoint the members of the Supreme Federal Court and of the superior courts; to dissolve the Council of the
Republic; to enact, promulgate, publish, and veto, totally or partially,
the laws, or to ask Congress to reconsider them; and to declare war
and to enter' into peace treaties. The Council of the Republic was a
superior body of consultation to the President and had the authority,
in certain cases, to appoint and to remove the Prime Minister, to dissolve the House of Deputies, and to intervene in all the issues that
were relevant to institutional stability. The Council of Defense
advised the President on all the issues related to national sovereignty
and the defense of democracy. The plan vested government functions
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in a Prime Minister and the members of the Council of Ministers, all
of whom could be removed by the House of Deputies. The Prime
Minister had ten days to present a program of government to the
House of Deputies, and he was to resign if the plan was rejected. The
Council of Ministers had some powers, including preparing the program of government.
Congress finally rejected the project on March 23, 1988 by the
vote of approximately half-of the members of both the right- and leftwing parties. There were strong military pressures for preserving the
presidentialist regime. The system which Congress approved is actually of this kind, providing a presidential term of five years without
reelection. However, the House of Deputies may censure the ministers of the cabinet by a vote of two-thirds of its members.
Venezuela also adopted a similar attenuation of the presidentialist system. The Constitution currently in force, adopted in 1961, calls
for many of the powers of the President, such as declaring a state of
emergency or negotiating loans, to be exerted in the Council of Ministers. In actual practice, however, the functions of that Council have
not been very relevant because the alternation between the two main
parties (ADECA and COPEI) has coincided with a similar change in
parliamentary majority. Thus, the President was never limited by
ministers that were independent from him because of their parlimentary connections. In the reform of 1983, another element of parliamentarism was introduced requiring that the President present in
the first year of his term of office a program of social and economic
development to be approved by both Houses in a joint session.
A weak system of censure also exists in Costa Rica, whose Constitution of 1949 establishes that the ministers may be interpelled by
the legislative assembly and may even be censured by two-thirds of
the votes of the members who are present if they are found guilty of
illegal or unconstitutional acts or acts which cause manifest harm to
public powers.
In Uruguay, the Constitution of 1966, which has returned to the
essentials of the Constitution of 1942 after abandoning the collegiate
system of government which was in force since 1952, also includes
some elements of parliamentarism. The President exercises his executive power with the agreement of the Council of Ministers, or he may
delegate to the appropriate minister. The House may interpellate the
ministers, and the General Assembly may censure them. Parliament
may be dissolved if it affirms by three-fifths of its votes the censure of
a minister that the President opposed. In such a case, the President
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may call for new parliamentary elections so that the electorate arbitrates the conflict.
The system established in Peru by the 1979 Constitution goes
even further in the parliamentary direction. The President is the chief
of state and personifies the nation. He has the power to formulate the
general political direction of government, but he must appoint a chief
of cabinet who serves as the President of the Council of Ministers.
This species of prime minister proposes to the President the names of
the other ministers and presides over mfieetings of the Council of Ministers. He has few other relevant powers, however, because most
executive functions, including control of the administration, are concentrated in the President. The Council of Ministers has the functions, among others granted by law, of approving the projects that the
President sends to Congress, approving legislative decrees, and deliberating over public issues. The House of Deputies may affect the
political responsibility of the Council of Ministers or of individual
ministers through a vote of censure or no confidence by more than
half of the members. The President of the Republic may dissolve the
House of Deputies if it has censured three councils of ministers. In
such cases, the President must hold elections within thirty days.
In Chile, a kind of parliamentary system was in force from 1891
to 1924. The precedent for this system was found in the Constitution
of 1833, which granted to Congress the power to approve periodically
some acts of the executive, particularly with regard to expenditures
and taxes. Successive reforms led to more limitations of the administration in favor of Congress. In 1891, after a conflict over the budget,
Parliament deposed President Balmaceda, and imposed a parliamentary system simply by full enforcement of all the previous reforms.
For instance, the impeachment of ministers by accusation of the
House of Representatives before the Senate was greatly facilitated.
This period of Chilean parliamentarianism was characterized by a
strong tendency of the plurality of political parties to conciliate and
negotiate. It was also a period of stability and respect for legal guarantees of individual rights.
But in 1925, after the forceful termination of Congress, a new
constitution was enacted establishing a presidentialist system.
According to this Constitution, the President is elected by the people
if he is favored by more than fifty percent of the votes, otherwise Congress chooses between the two candidates achieving the highest
number of votes. The President assumed a large number of powers
which were further expanded by the reforms of 1934 and 1970.
Indeed, they even granted him the ability to enact decrees with the
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force of law and to take most economic measures on his own. It is
obvious that this plethora of powers and the attempts to exert them
might collide with the existing consensus, as occurred under President
Allende.
Quite recently, most Chilean political parties formed a commission of constitutional lawyers which analyzed the defects of the Chilean presidentialist system-blockages between the parties, the
inability of Parliament to control the executive, lack of representation
due to the multiplicity of parties, and so forth. The commission proposed a plan which would establish a mixed system with a president
as chief of state and a prime minister as chief of government, with the
latter acting in conformance to a program approved by the House of
Deputies. The House may also censure the ministers in a constructive
modality. The proposed system also differentiates the functions of
both Houses of Congress so that the Senate functions as a review
chamber.
A mixed system of government was adopted by Haiti in 1987,
closely following the scheme of the French Constitution. Most other
Latin American countries have strong presidentialist regimes. One
extreme version, established by the Mexican Constitution of 1917, is
still in force.
In the case of Argentina, the Constitution presently in force,
enacted in 1853, also established a strong presidentialist regime
modeled after the United States. But it went even further by providing a rather long term for the President-six years without reelection-excluding the requirement that cabinet members be confirmed
by the Senate and granting to the President wide powers, which have
been much abused, concerning declaration of a state of siege and
intervention in the provinces.
President Peron promoted the enactment of a new constitution in
1949 through a process whose legitimacy was contested by the opposition. This Constitution, which amply recognized social rights, further
accentuated the presidentialist system, providing for the direct election of the President, allowing the possibility of his reelection and
granting to him certain powers, such as declaring a state of alarm and
emergency without the intervention of Congress. The ensuing military regime annulled Peron's Constitution and reestablished the 1853
Constitution. In 1957, a constitutional convention was elected, with
the proscription of the Peronist Party. Its only contribution was the
introduction of a clause concerning social rights, which is still in
force.
In 1972, a military government decreed reforms to the Constitu-
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tion that remained in force during the constitutional government,
which lasted from 1973 to 1976. Among other things, it shortened
the presidential term to four years, allowed reelection, unified all the
electoral processes, and improved some parliamentary mechanisms.
During that Peronist government, an official proposal for reforming
the Constitution, including the introduction of a prime minister, was
never carried out.
In 1986, President Alfonsin requested an advisory body, the
Council for the Consolidation of Democracy, to study a possible revision to the 1853 Constitution. The Council issued two reports, one in
1982 and one in 1987, proposing, among other things, the adoption of
a mixed system of government as described above.47 The reports also
sought to differentiate further the functions of both houses of Congress, to adopt mechanisms of direct popular participation, to
strengthen federalism, and to recognize some social rights. The ruling
Radical Party adopted these proposals, and they engaged in conversations with opposition parties, mainly the Peronist, to achieve the necessary consensus for initiating the formal procedures of constitutional
reform. The electoral confrontation which occurred during the presidential elections of May 14, 1989 prevented the achievement of a consensus among the parties on this issue. Thus, the same factors which
contribute to the weakness of the presidential system-particularly
political competition among parties-have stopped its reform.
Carlos Saul Menem, the Peronist Party candidate, won the presidential election. He assumed office on July 8, 1989. Mr. Alfonsin had
to resign before the expiration of his term when he realized that he
lacked the consensus needed to undertake the severe measures that
the economic crisis of the country requires. Critics of the Peronist
Party imply that the Peronists will try to carry out a model of democracy that is conditioned by explicit or implicit agreements with different corporative groups. Peronist defenders claim otherwise. They
argue that their approach is consistent with a conception of democracy that is attuned to different expressions of interests and ideas.
They claim that the sources of those expressions are not limited solely
to those conveyed by political parties and formal institutions. They
argue further that their approach has the added advantage of preventing the democratic government from becoming as powerless as that of
Alfonsin's during the last period of his rule. Only time will provide a
47. See CONSEJO
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perspective from which to judge this new phase of Argentine
democracy.
In the meantime, the issue of constitutional reform will remain
viable through the forum of public discussion. The Peronist leaders
themselves, including President Menem, have repeatedly declared
that they will promote that reform. They claim that it may come as
early as 1990. It is not clear, however, what sort of reform they
would advocate. Some of their representatives support only minor
modifications in the system of government-mainly reducing the
presidential term from six to four years and allowing the President to
seek reelection for one additional term. Moreover, they seem genuinely concerned with emphasizing a wider recognition of social rights.
Nevertheless, experience in government may teach the new leaders that it is impossible to be sensitive to the interests and rights of the
people without containing corporative power. Such containment can
only be achieved through strong political parties and direct citizen
participation. This requires a more flexible mechanism for the succession of power-the mixed parliamentary presidential system recommended in this Article.

